Key Highlights
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- Despite the absence of Kristaps Porzingis, the Boston Celtics posted their best offensive rating of the series in Game 3 (108.9)
- Jaylen Brown also starred with 30 points, including 10-of-13 shooting from inside the arc
- After 31 points, Jayson Tatum came out of his slump, while adding six rebounds, five assists and one steal.
Among the most important aspects of the Dallas Mavericks' run to the NBA Finals was their defensive scheme. They always put a center, Daniel Gafford or Derek Lively II, in the paint by putting them in a motion/non-shooting machine, no matter where they stand. Doing so allowed Dallas to not trade, confident that any collapse on the perimeter would be covered by the empty rim protection inside.
By playing a game of eight shooters, the Boston Celtics challenged that scheme. They threw in the towel on Dallas in the first half of Game 1 before the Mavericks responded after halftime by being more diligent in maintaining their center as the underdog, regardless of who they were guarding or what their starting assignment ended up being.
In Game 2, Boston debated hiding its guards – usually Jrue Holiday, but also Derrick White – in the dunker zone, switching to a one-out, one-out look instead of its traditional five-out formation. That move took Dallas' centers out of the paint and forced its guards into menial responsibilities as rim protectors, jobs for which they are ill-suited.
In Game 3, the Mavericks kept their centers down against any odds. Gafford and Lively often communicated with their teammates by switching positions on the floor to sit near the hoop on the weak side.
At first, that strategy worked. The Celtics players were sticking around. Things usually end with a good, but acceptable look on defense, as Boston has been the league's best offense this season. With 5.5 minutes left, Dallas led 17-7, and the absence of Kristaps Porzingis was evident at both ends.
At the end of the night, the Celtics were victorious, 106-99. They held a 3-0 lead and posted their best average of the series at 108.9 — 2.4 points better than their season-best mark and 3.2 points better than their season-best mark.
Their dynamic, multi-faceted, sweet-shooting offense opened up thanks to several turnovers that confused Dallas' defense and pushed their bigs into unfamiliar territory.
During Game 1, head coach Joe Mazzella told his team to “manage the gaps” in five-on-five settings where there is no numerical advantage. That's how they came through in Game 3 to enjoy a strong showing.
Boston's offense is unique in the rest of the league in that it is loaded with five reliable shooters whenever Porzingis is healthy; even Xavier Tillman — who saw Game 3 minutes in his place — had three hits Wednesday night. It affects a lot of ball handlers, giving the Celtics the freedom to organize the offense anywhere on the floor or, at the very least, be a threat to do so.
That flexibility means that the strong side and the weak side can be turned at any time. While many offenses understandably focus on exceptional shooters or poor cutters because they lack ball skills, Boston can do that and entrust many of those same players to be threats with the ball. So, that's exactly how the Celtics chose to target the Dallas gambit: quickly flip the weak side to the strong side.
When Gafford or Lively hid as a low man, looking to blow up any touch of the paint, Boston was swinging the ball toward their assignment in the corner, someone – besides Tillman – was always a reliable shooter. They couldn't provide a soft closeout and invite warmup long balls.
The Celtics reoriented the balance of the floor and wanted Gafford and Lively to guard their assignments rather than guard the floor. Their 21.4 percent of corner threes in Game 3 was a season high (99 games) and they found the net on 7 of their 18 attempts (38.9 percent).
And they had Jayson Tatum and Jaylen Brown — their two premier creators — working the corners more often as well. It made the burden even worse on the Dallas bigs, who were unsure whether to lock down the backcourt because of their driving skills or how far they could go early because of their shooting chops.
That's a fact made possible by the presence of effective secondary football managers like Holiday, White and Payton Pritchard. It's not uncommon for teams to put their stars in the corners and let others run the offense without serious consequences. Boston's depth embeds this flexibility and adaptability.
Such adjustments left smaller defenders to guard the paint, leading driving lanes, post opportunities, and catch-and-shoot opportunities. Not only did moving the ball back put the young Mavericks in interior work, it prompted Gafford and Lively to cover or play in space without the ball. Everyone was caught in the wrong roles.
Not every asset has a single advantage that came from the flexibility of turning a big into a tight corner. At times, the dynamic effect of the lack of size on the inside has enabled the Celtics to find success in other ways such as driving against the big man as an offensive point guard, weak cuts, and offensive rebounds.
Everything was built on the same principle, however: the big one had to protect the player instead of the place. Control the space.
The pair's performances in the third quarter exemplified some of the Mavericks' challenges.
First, the Gafford shades help as the man on the floor and the Celtics kick the ball quickly, leaving him shut down – an unreasonable request for most big players – and eventually scoring.
Second, with Holiday again in the weak corner, Gafford turns early when Brown catches the ball upfield. Since he wasn't in the previous game and it cost him, he wants to prepare for any possible drive or shot from Holiday. That rotation opens up Tatum to make his mark and, in turn, score at the rim.
Control the space. It's rampant throughout the Celtics' offensive line.
At times, as Boston settled and thrived against this scheme, Dallas responded with traditional matchups. Gafford and Lively take on the big stuff and get thrown into the action. They changed and entered the perimeter. At one point, the Mavericks went down and PJ Washington took the 5 spot.
Against these tactics, the Celtics still produced high-quality shots, including threes from White and Brown, and Brown's vociferous jam to mark the tide-changing third quarter. For every strategy that Dallas tested, Boston and its abundance of offensive depth held back to minimize its impact.
After the Mavericks came back and turned a 21-point lead into the fourth quarter, it was a tough battle for the Celtics.
Lively takes on Holiday, realizing she's starting on the weak side. He's the only player he can guard at that point because everyone else is over the break and Lively has already backed off the paint.
Yet that is exactly what Boston wanted Lively to do. The holidays are right around the corner and Lively is staying close. Tatum gets Kyrie Irving in transition. Josh Green is the man on the ground — a very different blocker than Dallas thought it would have when Lively first got attached to Holiday.
The sloppy pass ends in a dunk thanks to Green's (justifiable) gamble and the fact that he's a 6-foot-5 wing who is easily thrown away — not a tough, 7-foot-1 rim protector. Control the space.
For most of the night, Boston excelled at hiding the strong side versus the weak side against the Dallas defense. Despite a short fourth quarter, the Mavericks didn't know how to combat the Celtics' deceptive offense.
There is nothing revolutionary about strategic adjustments like this, nor should there be. The program is loaded. The most important part is that Mazzulla and Co. How quickly they changed the game plan. They assessed the situation and almost created a way to escalate the offense.
Boston's coaching staff has been excellent in this series (and all year), making a number of quick changes, which should stop any continued success for Dallas. Game 3 was just the latest in a string of performances — bringing the entire organization to the brink of a title for the first time in 16 years.
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